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INTRODUCTION
In June 1993, the Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE) introduced futures and options
contracts for cheddar cheese and nonfat dry milk .   These new contracts provided the opportunity
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for dairy industry participants -- dairy farmers, manufacturers, distributors, and others -- to manage
price risk in an era of increasingly volatile dairy markets.  
Now, expanded risk management opportunities exist via futures and options contracts for
Grade A milk.  On October 10, 1995, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission approved Grade
A milk futures and options contracts for both the CSCE and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME).  The CSCE began trading these contracts on December 12, 1995.  The CME announced a
starting date of January 11, 1996. 
In this paper we discuss these new milk futures contracts, focusing on their potential uses for
hedging.  We explain the differences between the CSCE and the CME contracts and implications for
hedgers.  Several hedging examples are provided.  In this paper, we deal exclusively with the futures
contracts.  In a later paper, to be issued after some trading experience with the new contracts, we will
look at related options contracts offered by both exchanges and their potential use in a risk
management strategy.       The support price was raised to $10.35 per hundredweight on January 1, 1996, under provisions of the 1990
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Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act.  New dairy legislation is being debated that will likely change
the support price.
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WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF FUTURES CONTRACTS?
Futures contracts are marketing tools for managing price risk.  Using futures to manage price
risks is not new.  Futures contracts for grains have been traded for about 130 years.  Today, more
than one hundred different commodities are traded on U.S. futures markets. 
There had been only limited experience with dairy futures prior to introduction of the cheese,
nonfat dry milk, and milk contracts.  From the early 1950s until 1976, the CME traded butter futures.
However, the contract was lightly traded, mainly because, there was little need for dairy futures
markets to manage price risk for producers and there was little interest on the part of speculators in
trading a commodities with an effective price floor.  
The federal dairy price support program provided a relatively high floor (safety net) under
manufacturing milk prices directly and under Grade A milk prices indirectly.  The federal dairy price
support program requires USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation to purchase unlimited quantities
of surplus butter, cheddar cheese and nonfat dry milk at specified prices that  enable manufacturers
of these products to pay the support price.  This federal price support program provided price
protection for milk and dairy products.  For many years, there was little price risk and therefore, there
was no interest in dairy futures as a risk management tool. 
But all that has changed.  The federal price support level for milk has been cut from $13.10
per hundredweight in 1981 to $10.10 per hundredweight in 1990, where it remains today.   At this
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low level of price support, market forces -- not the federal support program  -- determine cheddar
cheese and nonfat dry milk prices most of the time.  And for the past two years, even butter prices
have usually been above support.  Indeed, manufacturing milk prices (as measured by the M-W price
and the more recent Basic Formula Price) have not been at support since 1988.
Market-driven milk prices have created uncertain and volatile dairy product prices and milk
prices.  For example, for the past five years the ranges in the Minnesota-Wisconsin Price (M-W) per
hundredweight from high to low were: 1990, $3.75; 1991, $2.48; 1992, $1.61; 1993, $2.01; and
1994, $1.74.  Dairy producers, milk processors and marketers, and buyers of fluid milk and dairy
products now are exposed to major price risks.  As a result, there is increased interest in dairy futures
and options contracts as a tool to manage this price risk.
The risk of price change is reduced through the hedging on the futures market.  Hedging 
is taking opposite transactions in the cash and futures markets.  By taking opposite transactions losses
(gains) on the cash market can be offset by gains (losses) on the futures market.  With these offsetting
losses and gains, hedging enables the users of futures markets for price protection to realize close to
their price objectives.  We illustrate how this works in the paper.       The Basic Formula Price has been used since May 1995 as the federal order Class III price and Class II and
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Class I price mover.  From 1961 until May 1995, the M-W price served that role.  Both price series are based
on pay prices by (unregulated) Grade B plants in  Minnesota and Wisconsin.
       Alto Dairy Cooperative has been offering their producers cash forward contracts hedged through the CSCE
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cheddar cheese futures since August, 1994.  Since then, Swiss Valley Farms and Dairylea Cooperative have made
cash forward contracts available to producers and there may be others. 
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WHY GRADE A MILK FUTURES AND OPTIONS CONTRACTS?
Cheddar cheese and nonfat dry milk futures and options have been used since their inception
in June, 1993 as risk management tools by dairy farmers, milk processors and marketers and buyers
of cheese and milk powder.  But the interest has  been limited  and  trade  volume has been
disappointing. Both cheese and nonfat dry milk contract markets lack the broad liquidity enjoyed by
most commodity futures.
Cheddar cheese and nonfat dry milk futures and options may be used by both buyers and
sellers to protect themselves against changes in the prices of these manufactured dairy products.  But
these same contracts can be used to reduce the risk of a change in farm level milk prices.  This is
because the base price and mover of Grade A milk prices under all federal milk marketing orders is
the Basic Formula Price (BFP).   
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 The BFP is the grade B price paid to producers by butter, milk powder and cheese plants
located in Minnesota and Wisconsin adjusted by a product price formula for the same three products.
Since about 85 percent of the grade B milk in Wisconsin and 65 percent in Minnesota is used to make
cheese, cheese is the major determinant of the BFP.  About 90 percent of the change in the BFP may
be explained by changes in cheddar cheese prices.  With such a strong relationship, dairy producers
and buyers of farm level milk can use cheese futures and options contracts to reduce the risks from
changing milk prices.  Dairy cooperatives have successfully used cheese futures contracts to offer
cash forward price contracts to their producer members .    
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About 80 percent of all grade A milk is priced under federal milk marketing orders.  But
prices for grade A milk not priced under a federal order and prices for Grade B milk have similarly
strong relationships to cheese prices.  In California, for example, a state order is used to price grade
A milk.  But prices for cheese, nonfat dry milk and butter are used in a formula to calculate the
minimum pay prices to the state's dairy producers.  
Protecting milk prices via cheddar cheese futures contracts is a "cross hedge" (cheese prices
against milk prices) and not a "direct hedge" (milk prices against milk prices).  Although the price
relationship between cheddar cheese futures and milk is high, the price relationship between milk
futures contracts and milk prices should be even higher.  This is because other factors besides cheese
prices influence milk prices. 
    4
Further, dairy producers and fluid milk bottlers may have more interest in a direct hedge.
Dairy producers don't normally manufacture cheese.  Therefore, dairy producers may better relate
to milk prices than cheese prices.  And, since futures contracts are deliverable, dairy producers are
in a position to deliver milk but not cheese.  The same is true with fluid milk bottlers.  Bottlers are
interested in purchasing grade A milk for bottling.  Bottlers do not sell or purchase cheese.
Dairy cooperatives and other dairy companies who wish to offer cash forward price contracts
to dairy producers may find the grade A milk futures preferable to cheese futures.  Even if the milk
purchased by the cooperative is used to make cheese, the grade A milk futures provides for a direct
hedge, producer milk prices protected with grade A milk futures.  Cheese prices would not need to
be converted to milk prices, which is necessary when using cheese futures to offer cash forward
contracts to producers.  
WHO WILL USE THE MILK FUTURES CONTRACTS?
Dairy producers, firms that buy producer milk for bottling, and dairy product manufacturers
will likely be interested in using the new milk contracts.  
Dairy producers may use these contracts to lock in milk prices for future production.  For
example, in February a dairy producer might be concerned that milk prices will weaken towards
spring.  The producer sees that June milk futures contracts are trading at a reasonable level and in
February sells one or more June milk futures to protect future milk production against  declining milk
prices.  Prior to the delivery date of the June contract the producer would offset this position by
purchasing June milk futures contracts.  
The producer would deliver milk to a dairy cooperative or other milk buyer in June.  If the
price of milk had declined from February, the June milk futures price would have also fallen and a
profit would be made on the futures market from buying June milk futures at a lower price than what
they were sold for in February.  The profit from the milk futures is used to offset the lower price
received for June milk delivered to the cooperative.  By adding the futures market profit to the lower
June milk price received from the cooperative the producer receives a net June milk price close to
what was a price objective back in February.
 But what if milk prices had increased instead of  declining? June milk futures would be
purchased at a higher price than what they were sold for back in February and a loss would be
experienced on the futures market.  Nevertheless, after subtracting the futures loss, the producer still
nets a June milk price close to what was believed back in February to be a fair price for milk delivered
in June.  The objective of using dairy futures is not to receive the highest possible price, but rather
to protect a price objective.  This price objective is a reasonable price from the perspective of the
producer; a price that will return an acceptable profit.  Dairy producers should not lock in an
unacceptable price.  5
Dairy cooperatives or other milk buyers could provide a service by offering cash forward
contracts to dairy producers for milk delivered in the future to the plant.  The cooperative would use
the grade A milk futures contract to offer a cash forward contract at a specified price.  For example,
in February the cooperative quotes a price for milk to be delivered in June.  If a dairy producer
accepts this price offer, the cooperative protects itself by selling June milk futures.  When June rolls
around and the producer delivers his/her milk, the  cooperative offsets its futures position by
purchasing June milk futures.  If June milk prices have declined from when the hedge was placed,
then the cooperative can still pay the producer the contract price with the profit generated from the
future market transactions.  If June milk prices were higher, the cooperative can still only pay the
producer the contract price because the loss experienced on the futures market would need to be
deducted from the higher milk price.
Cheese makers or other manufacturers of dairy products and bottlers of fluid milk may use
grade A milk futures to reduce their plant operation risks stemming from rising milk costs.  For
example, a cheese manufacturer could negotiate with a cheese buyer a price for cheese manufactured
and delivered at some future date.  The risk to the cheese maker is that the price of milk to make the
cheese may be higher than anticipated.  This would result in reduced plant margins or even a loss
from making the cheese and delivering it to the buyer at the prior negotiated price.  
But this milk cost risk could be reduced by using the Grade A milk futures for hedging.  For
example, assume that a cheese maker negotiates in May with a cheese buyer to deliver 50,000 pounds
of cheddar cheese in October at a specified price.  In determining its selling price the cheese maker
would consider the estimated cost of milk and manufacturing costs.  In May, the cheese maker could
use the trading price for October milk futures as its estimated milk cost  to make this cheese in
October.  
In May, the cheese maker would purchase October milk futures.  Then, in October when it
is time to procure milk and make the cheese, the cheese maker would offset the long position by
selling October milk futures.  If the cost of milk had increased, the cheese maker would experience
a profit on the futures market by selling October milk futures in October at a higher price than what
October milk futures were purchased for back in May.  The futures profit can be subtracted from the
higher cost milk procured and thereby protecting the margins of the cheese plant from delivering
cheddar cheese to the buyer in October at prices established in May.  If the cost of milk had declined,
then the cheese maker would have suffered a loss on the futures market.  Nevertheless, by adding the
loss to the lower cost of milk procured in October the cheese makers still experiences the plant
margin that it expected when it placed its hedge.
                    
The concept would be similar for a bottler attempting to negotiate the future sale of packaged
milk at a specified price to a large retail food chain.  A future selling price could be negotiated.  The
bottler could reduce the risk from higher than anticipated milk costs by purchasing milk futures at
the time the price for packaged milk to be delivered at a future date was negotiated.  Then, when the
milk was later procured, packaged and delivered to the retail chain the bottler would sell milk futures.6
As with the cheese maker, the bottler, through the use of milk futures, would have reduced its plant
margin risk associated with changing milk costs.
A buyer of packaged milk could itself use milk futures to negotiate with a bottler a supply of
packaged milk to be delivered at some date in the future at a specified price.  The danger to the buyer
is that farm level milk prices decline, lowering the price for, packaged milk.  The buyer would be at
competitive disadvantage in attempting to selling packaged milk to its customers at the previously
negotiated higher price.  The buyer would either have to risk loss of customers or sell its packaged
milk at a loss.  
But this problem could be reduced by hedging in milk futures.  When negotiating the purchase
price for packaged milk to be delivered at a future date, the buyer would protect itself from a
subsequent fall in price by selling a milk futures.  For example, let's say a buyer in October wishes
to lock in a price for packaged milk purchased and delivered in December.  The buyer would use the
December milk futures to negotiate its fixed price and protects itself by selling December milk
futures.  
Then, when December rolls around and the packaged milk is delivered, the buyer purchases
December milk futures.  If the price of packaged milk had actually declined, the buyer would
experience a profit from the futures by purchasing December milk futures at a lower price than what
December milk futures sold for back in October.  The buyer can meet the competition in selling
packaged milk in December.  The profits from the futures market can be added to the lower selling
price for packaged milk.  If packaged milk prices had instead gone up, the buyer would experience
losses on the futures market.  Nevertheless, after subtracting these losses from the higher selling price
for packaged milk in December, the buyer still nets out a margin close to what was anticipated back
in October.
THE BASIS
Success in reducing price risks through hedging hinges on the predictability of the
relationship between the cash price and the futures price.  In this case, we are taking about the
relationship between the cash market price for Grade A milk and the grade A milk futures price.  The
relationship between the cash price and the futures price is referred to as the basis.  
Successful hedges are possible only if the basis relationship is known and predictable.  That's
because the net outcome of a hedge is equal to the change in the basis.  The likelihood of the  basis
being different at the time the hedge is placed and when it is removed or offset is referred to as basis
risk.  If the basis is exactly the same at placement and offset, then the net outcome will be equal to
what was anticipated when the hedge was set.  If the basis changes, the net outcome will be either
better or worse, depending on which direction it changed, from what was anticipated earlier when
the hedge was set.7
The level of basis is immaterial; i.e., it makes no difference whether the cash price for milk is,
for example, $1.00 per hundredweight higher or $1.00 per hundredweight lower than the milk futures
price.  What does matter is that this relationship is predictable and stable.  If it is, then losses (gains)
on the cash market will be closely offset by gains (losses) on the futures market.
The good news is that the basis is normally more predictable than cash prices.  Therefore the
risk exposure from a change in the basis is less than the risk of changing cash prices.  
CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS OF MILK FUTURES 
The contract specifications for grade A milk futures contracts for the NY CSCE and the CME
are given in the table below.  There are some significant differences between the two contracts.
Contract Specifications: Milk Futures Contracts, CSCE & CME
Contract Specification CSCE CME
Commodity FOB delivery of Grade A FOB delivery of Grade A
milk with 3.5 percent milk with 3.5 percent
butterfat content from an butterfat content to an
approved plant  approved plant 
Trading unit One tanker load  One tanker load  
Delivery Unit One tanker load; allowable One tanker load; allowable
variation 48,000 to 50,000 variation 3%
pounds
Trading hours 9:15 AM to 2:00 PM NY 8:00 Am to 1:00 PM
time
Delivery Months Feb., Apr., Jun.,Aug., Oct., Feb., Apr.,Jun., Jul., Sept.,
Dec. Nov.
Price Quotation Dollars and cents per Same
hundredweight
Minimum Fluctuation $.01 per cwt., equivalent to $.025 per cwt., equivalent to
$5.00 per contract $12.50 per contractContract Specification CSCE CME
8
Daily Price limits From previous day's From previous day's
settlement price, $.50 per settlement price no trading
cwt. with variable limits at a price more than $1.50
effective under certain per cwt.
conditions.  No price limits
on 2 nearby months, with no
limits on 3rd. nearby month
from first day of a delivery
month until the last trading
day of the delivery month
Standards Grade A raw milk with 3.5% Same
butterfat content
Delivery points From Interstate Milk To CME approved facilities
Shippers (IMS) certified within borders of Wisconsin
plants, receiving stations or and Minnesota  or that
transfer stations located in portion of surrounding
the Madison district of states included in the
Chicago federal order Chicago or Upper Midwest
federal orders.
Delivery  Pick up by the buyer from Seller to buyers facility
the seller's plant
Last trading day Six Exchange business days Seven Exchange business
prior to the last Exchange days prior to the last
business day of the delivery Exchange business day of
month  the delivery month
Notice of delivery  First exchange business day Same
following last trading dayContract Specification CSCE CME
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First and last delivery day First Exchange day following Buyer and seller shall select
notice day up to the last a day so that delivery can be
Exchange business day of the made by the last calendar
delivery month day of the delivery month. 
If no agreement is conveyed
to the Clearing House, the
Exchange will chose a
delivery date from calendar
days beginning four days
after notice of no agreement
and ending on the last
calendar day of the delivery
month
The biggest distinction between the CSCE and the CME grade A milk contracts is the delivery
point.  The CSCE contract requires delivery from an approved plant or facility in the Madison,
Wisconsin district of the Chicago Regional federal milk marketing order.  The buyer is responsible
for picking up the shipment and assuming all transportation costs from that point.  The CME requires
delivery to a CME approved facility within the borders of Wisconsin and Minnesota or located in that
portion of surrounding states included in the Chicago Regional or Upper Midwest Federal Milk
Marketing orders.  The seller assumes all transportation costs to the buyer's facility except that the
buyer will be assessed a standard freight rate per mile for each additional mile the milk is hauled over
and above the distance between the seller's facility and either Eau Claire or Fond du Lac, Wisconsin.
The excess hauling cost will paid to the seller.
There are other differences in delivery conditions.  For the CSCE contract, the seller is
required to give notice of intentions to deliver by the first Exchange business day following the last
trading day and delivery can be made from the first Exchange day following notice day to the last
Exchange business day of the delivery month.  For example, if October milk futures had been
available in 1995, the Notice of delivery would have been required by Tuesday, October 24 (the first
business day following the last trading day which would have been Monday, October 23).  Delivery
could be made as soon as Wednesday, October 25, but would have to be delivered by Tuesday,
October 31.
The notice procedure is similar for the CME, but there are differences in delivery procedures.
After notice of intentions to deliver by the seller, the seller and the buyer are to select a mutually
agreeable day and time for arrival so that the shipment can be received by the last calendar day of the
delivery month.  Again using October, 1995, that would have been October 31st.  The last day could
fall on a weekend or holiday.  If no agreement is reached by 12:00 noon on the day after the buyer10
submits routing instructions, the seller shall notify the Clearing House and an arrival date will be
chosen by the CME from those calendar days beginning four days after assignment by the Clearing
House and ending on the last calendar day of the month.
Another difference between contract provisions are delivery months.  Although both
Exchanges have six delivery months, the months are different.  Both Exchanges have February, April,
and June as delivery months.  Additional delivery months for the CSCE are August, October, and
December.  But for the CME the additional delivery months are July, September, and November.
While the CSCE uses every other month beginning with February as delivery months, the CME starts
the same but then has two back-to-back months, June and July and then returns every other month,
but has no delivery months for two months, December and January.
There are also differences in the minimum price fluctuations.  Price changes are $.01 per
hundredweight, $5.00 per contract for the CSCE.  The CME allows minimum price changes of $.025
per hundredweight or $12.50 per contract.  Daily price limits also differ.  These are limits on how
much a contract price may change from the previous day's settlement price. The CME specifies a limit
of no more than $1.50 per hundredweight.  The CSCE sets this limit at no more than $.50 per
hundredweight.  However, there are no price limits on the two nearby months for the CSCE contract
and no limit on the third nearby month from the first day of a delivery month until the last trading day
of the delivery month.
There is a slight difference between the two contracts in allowable variations in quantity
delivered.  The CSCE will allow a cash settlement in lieu of delivery, but only if the seller fails to
satisfy the grade specifications in an intitial attempt to deliver.  In that case, the seller is obligated to
deliver a substitute load within 72 hours and be responsible for all costs associated with the
substitution.  Alternatively, the buyer may request a cash settlement in lieu of the substitute delivery,
but with some penalty imposed upon the seller.
Under the CME milk futures contract, if the seller fails to present "deliverable milk" at the
time and place specified, the seller will be penalized $.50 per hundredweight each day until the
requirements are met.  If the seller fails to deliver a load of milk, the seller will be penalized $1.50 per
hundredweight on each day until the requirements are met.  Further, if a buyer fails to unload
"deliverable milk", the buyer will be penalized $.50 per hundredweight and if it is not unloaded within
12 hours, the penalty is increased to $1.50 per hundredweight. 
Both the CSCE and the CME specify that grade A milk deliveries be from or to, respectively,
a facility regulated under a federal milk marketing order.  Federal milk marketing orders use classified
pricing, setting minimum pay prices for milk according to use class.  Class III-A is skim milk used for
nonfat dry milk.  The minimum price is established via a nonfat dry milk product price formula.  Class
III is grade A milk used to make cheese.  The minimum price for class III is the current month's Basic
Formula Price (BFP).  Class II is grade A milk used for soft manufacture dairy products (yogurt,
cottage cheese, ice cream, etc.) and is based on the BFP two months previous plus $.30 per       This chart is derived from data supplied periodically by the Market Administrator's Office, Upper Midwest
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Milk Marketing Order.  The Grade A manufacturing milk price is calculated by subtracting federal order pool
draws (revenues associated with market-wide sales of Class I and Class II sales) from reported pay prices of
plants engaged exclusively or predominantly in manufacturing Class III products.
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hundredweight.  Class I is grade A milk used for beverage purposes and is also priced using the BFP
two months previous plus a class I differential that varies with distance from Eau Claire, Wisconsin.
Deliveries of milk under both contracts will be subject to federal order pricing rules.  The
federal order class specification for both contracts is Class III.  Class III-a, Class II, and Class I price
differentials will apply to the delivery settlement price.  In other words, those taking delivery will be
responsible for any additional costs associated with higher uses (Classes I and II) or any reduced cost
if the milk is used for Class III-A and the federal order Class III-A is less than the Class III price.
WHAT WILL THE NEW MILK FUTURES CONTRACTS PRICE?
Since the new milk futures contracts price Class III milk and since the minimum Class III price
in all federal orders is the Basic Formula Price (BFP), it would seem logical to assume that the
contracts will "price" the BFP; that is, that futures prices will represent the expected value of the BFP
for the delivery month.  
However, the actual value of Grade A milk used for Class III purposes seldom matches the
BFP.  In Wisconsin and other Midwestern states, intensive competition for milk elevates Grade A
milk prices well above minimum blend prices, implying plant costs for Grade A milk used for
manufacturing higher than the BFP.  
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the Grade A manufacturing milk price in Wisconsin
and the M-W price (the predecessor of the BFP) for 1984-94.   During that period, Grade A
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manufacturing milk prices increased steadily above the M-W price.  In recent years, Grade A plants
paid $.70-$1.00 per hundredweight more than the BFP for milk used to make Class III products.       Grade A manufacturing plants typically negotiate substantial "give-up" charges for spot sales of milk for
7
diversion to fluid use.
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Figure 1
Under the CSCE milk contract, with delivery points in the vicinity of Madison, eligible plants
would not likely be willing to supply milk for delivery at the Basic Formula Price if they were
obligated to pay producers more.  The cost to acquire milk for delivery would be at least the Grade
A cost to the plant for Class III milk.  Plants may demand even more, since the unanticipated
reduction in supply would disrupt manufacturing schedules and cause the plant to operate at reduced
input levels.   If these added costs are reflected in the futures price, then the CSCE milk futures price
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would be expected to exceed the BFP by the amount necessary to induce delivery from Grade A
plants.  Of course, this assumes that delivery, rather than offset, is viewed as a viable option for
hedgers.
If the CSCE contract prices the Madison, Wisconsin, district Grade A price rather than the
BFP, establishing a basis for hedging purposes will be more difficult than if the contract prices the       Distressed Grade A milk from regulated plants is subject to federal order minimum pricing rules.  But dairy
8
cooperatives, which are exempt from paying minimum producer blend prices, account for most interorder
shipments of milk in excess of local manufacturing capacity.
13
BFP.  There is no routinely-reported Grade A manufacturing price.  Consequently, hedgers will need
to predict the Grade A premium for Class III milk in the Madison district and use that value in
relation to the BFP in their calculation of basis.  This does not pose a serious problem as long as the
relationship between the Grade A price and the BFP is reasonably predictable and the contract does
not "switch" from pricing the BFP to pricing the Grade A price.
The CME contract price could be affected in a different way.  The CME contract specifies
plants regulated under the Chicago and Upper Midwest orders as destinations for delivery.  Contract
sellers bear all or most of the cost of delivery to the destination.  The milk may originate from eligible
Grade A milk plants anywhere in the U.S.  
This raises the possibility that the CME milk contract will price "distressed" milk; i.e., milk
volume that temporarily  exceeds plant capacity in some region.  Distressed milk moving to Wisconsin
for manufacturing typically sells at a discount to the BFP.   Suppliers are willing to incur large hauling
8
costs in order to find a home for the milk.
Moreover, the location of distressed milk and the related cost of delivery to a Chicago or
Upper Midwest order-regulated plant could vary from month-to-month.  And, at times, the delivered
cost of distressed milk to Midwestern plants could exceed the cost of local supplies.  Because of their
different delivery terms, the CME contract price would be expected to be at or below the CSCE
price.  The CME price would equal the CSCE price if the delivered cost of Grade A milk from the
lowest price area equalled or exceeded the Grade A price in the delivery region.  If the CME contract
prices distressed milk that suppliers are willing to ship to the Midwest at delivered price less than the
Grade A price in the delivery region, then the CME contract would be expected to trade at a discount
to the CSCE contract.
The possibility that the CME contract will price distressed milk poses a potential problem for
hedgers because the basis would be unpredictable.  For example, at the time a hedge is placed, the
CME contract price might reflect a temporary surplus of milk in New Mexico and the related willing-
ness of a cooperative to incur a substantial loss to ship the excess milk to Wisconsin for manufac-
turing.  That price might be lower than the BFP.  At the time the hedge is lifted, the CME contract
price might represent a normal supply situation, pricing the Grade A manufacturing milk price in
Minnesota and Wisconsin.  That price would be above the BFP.  In other words, the price expectation
when the hedge was placed would be different from the price expectation when the hedge was lifted
because the underlying futures price was, in effect, pricing different commodities.
These concerns may be immaterial if delivery occurs only very infrequently.  In that case, both
contracts would likely price the BFP.  That is because the BFP is the only consistently reported,
verifiable, nationally applicable milk price.  That, in itself, may ensure that the contracts price the14
BFP, and that parties choosing to make or take delivery bear any additional costs or risks.  Since
delivery is (intentionally) very difficult under both contracts, we suspect that it will be a rare event.
In the hedging examples below, we assume that the CSCE and CME milk contracts price the
BFP.  If that is not the case, then hedgers will need to account for deviations in establishing basis.
HEDGING WITH THE MILK FUTURES CONTRACTS - SOME EXAMPLES
A stated reason for introducing the new milk futures contracts is to provide more
straightforward hedging opportunities for dairy farmers and dairy plants buying raw milk.  The
cheddar cheese futures contract, which has traded on the Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange since
June 1993 can and has been used for hedging milk.  This involves a cross-hedge; protecting a price
for one commodity by trading futures contracts for another commodity.  Since cheese and milk prices
move together very closely, hedging milk using the cheese futures is not a particularly risky cross-
hedge.  Nonetheless, the exchanges felt that a direct hedge (trading raw milk futures contracts to
protect raw milk prices) would be easier for many hedgers to understand and use.
Assuming that the new milk futures contracts "price" the Basic Formula Price, hedging is
straightforward for some potential users.  But it is not for others.  Fluid milk processors should find
it easy to derive accurate price expectations based on milk futures prices (i.e, basis risk will likely be
small).  Dairy plants who buy milk on a volume basis and dairy farmers who sell milk by the hundred-
weight will also find the new contracts reasonably simple to use for hedging.  However, plants paying
for milk components rather than milk volume can only use the futures contracts to cross hedge
component prices against the futures milk price.  Likewise, dairy farmers paid under multiple
component pricing arrangements will need to convert milk futures prices to related component prices
or convert component prices to equivalent expected milk prices if they engage in hedging.
Several hedging examples are shown below.  We caution the reader that these are simplified
examples to illustrate the concept of hedging with the milk futures contracts and the types of hedges
that might be placed.
FLUID MILK PROCESSOR HEDGING
Possibly the most direct hedging opportunity with the milk contracts is for fluid milk bottling
plants that purchase their entire raw milk supply from cooperatives.  This is because all multiple
component pricing (MCP) plans in effect under federal milk marketing orders exempt fluid handlers
(bottlers) from MCP payments.  In all orders, fluid handlers' pool obligation is the order Class I price15
plus or minus an adjustment for butterfat content above or below 3.5 percent.  The minimum Class
I price is the basic formula price from two months earlier plus a fixed Class I differential.  Hence, a
handler can lock in an order price two months beyond the contract month for the milk futures
contract.
Fluid handlers acquiring milk from cooperatives typically pay more than the order minimum
Class I price in the form of an "over-order" or "superpool" premium added to the announced Class
I price.  These premiums are a source of basis risk, but they are usually announced two months in
advance, and usually do not change substantially from month-to-month.
An example of a potential hedge by a fluid milk bottler is illustrated in the table below.  The
example assumes that the bottler forward contracts for delivery of half-pints of milk to a school
district on a fixed price basis.  The bottler's largest cost is raw milk, so it wants to protect its
contracted price by locking in its raw milk cost.
Fluid Milk Processor Hedge to protect contracted sale
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
Jan. '96 Bottler needs 500,000 pounds of BUY 10 Feb. contracts @ $3.50
milk to supply April school milk $11.50
contract.
Class I Differential = $2.50.
Coop premium = $1.00.
Price objective is $15.00.
Case I:  Futures price increase/No basis change
Feb. '96 SELL 10 Feb. contracts
Apr. '96 Bottler purchases 500,000 pounds $3.50
Gain/(Loss) ($1.00) $1.00
Net Gain  $0.00
of milk from coop @ $16.00.
@ $12.50.
Case II:  Futures price increase/Basis strengthens16
Feb. '96 SELL 10 Feb. contracts
Apr. '96 Bottler purchases 500,000 pounds $4.00
Gain/(Loss) ($0.50) $1.50
Net Gain
of milk from coop @ $17.00.
(Coop premium increased to $1.50)
($2.00)
@ $13.00
Case III:  Futures price decrease/Basis weakens
Feb. '96 SELL 10 Feb. contracts @
Apr. '96 Bottler purchases 500,000 pounds $3.25
Gain/(Loss) $.25 ($.50)
Net Gain
of milk from coop @ $14.25.
(Coop premium decreased to $.75)
$.75
$11.00
In this example, the bottler would have established its contract price to the school district by
converting the February 1996 futures price into a related raw product price that would have permitted
a normal profit.  With no change in the basis (the difference between the  bottler's expected
procurement price and the futures contract price), any potential loss from a price increase in the cash
market would be offset by a gain from futures market transactions.  
Because of the lag in Class I pricing under federal orders, the bottler would place its hedge
in the futures contract delivery month two months before the milk was to be purchased. It would then
offset its long futures market position two months before procuring milk in the cash market.  Since
cooperatives price milk to their buyers according to federal order pricing rules, the lagged BFP, not
the current month BFP, establishes the processors fluid milk price.
There are only two sources of basis risk in this example:  (1)  The coop overorder premium
may be different from what the plant expected when it placed its hedge; or (2) the futures market
price may not converge with the basic formula price in the delivery month.  
In case II of the example, the coop supplying the bottler negotiated a premium higher than
what the bottler expected.  This resulted in a basis higher than expected (strengthened basis), leading
to a net loss from the hedge.  In Case III,  the coop premium was less than expected (basis17
weakened), and the hedge showed a net gain.  Note that the Class I differential is fixed and cannot
affect the basis.
Convergence of cash and underlying futures prices during the month of delivery is usually
assured because of arbitrage -- gains from "buying low" and "selling high" cause the cash and futures
prices to come together at the time of delivery.  In actively-traded futures markets, there is essentially
no risk that prices will not converge.  However, as noted earlier, there is some question about what
cash market price the futures price will converge with in the case of the milk futures.
FLUID MILK SUPPLIER HEDGING
Another fluid milk hedging opportunity involves a cooperative supplying milk to a fluid
bottler.  The hedge would be different depending on whether the supply contract was an open price
or fixed price contract.  With an open price contract, the cooperative would be interested in locking
in a price that represented a profitable fluid milk price for its members.  It would place a short hedge
(short futures market position with subsequent offsetting purchase) to protect against a price decline.
Under a fixed price contract, the cooperative would need to protect its procurement cost, and would
place a long hedge (long futures market position with subsequent offsetting sale).
Let's look at a simple open price supply contract hedge first.  Assume that in January 1996,
a cooperative agrees to supply one million pounds of milk to a fluid bottler in June.  The price when
the milk is delivered will be the BFP for April plus $3.75 per hundredweight.  This pricing formula
conforms with federal order pricing rules:  The minimum Class I price is the Basic Formula Price from
two months earlier plus a Class I differential that is constant from month-to-month.  Assume that the
Class I differential applying in this market is $2.50 per hundredweight.  Further, assume that the
cooperative is a member of a over-order bargaining federation that has negotiated a $1.25 per
hundredweight Class I premium with all  fluid  handlers in the  marketing area.  Under these
assumptions, the basis for the hedging transaction is $3.75, the sum of the order Class I differential
and the overorder premium.
The cooperative feels that the $12.00 futures price for April 1996 represents an optimistic
price level, and decides to lock in the related fluid milk price of $15.75.  To do so, it sells milk
contracts equal in volume to its contracted cash market sale, or 20 50,000-pound contracts.  Because
of the formula lag in pricing, the cooperative will place its hedge in the futures contract delivery
month that is two months prior to the month it will make its milk delivery; it is hedging in the month
when the sale is priced, not when it occurs.
In this example, futures market gains from offsetting the hedge cancel cash market losses
(relative to the price expectation) if the futures price falls between the time the hedge is placed and
when it is lifted.  Likewise, cash market gains (relative to expectations) cancel futures market losses
if the futures price increases.  With no change in basis, gains and losses exactly match, meaning that
the cooperative exactly achieves its locked-in price.18
This is an unusually risk-free hedge.  As long as the milk futures contracts price the BFP and
there is convergence in the futures market delivery month, there is no basis risk in this hedging
example.  That is because the cooperative has locked its sales price to the BFP.  
Cooperative contracts to supply milk to a fluid bottler at future date
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
Jan. '96 Cooperative signs an open price SELL 20 Apr. $3.75
contract to supply a fluid bottler with 1 contracts @ $12.00.
million pounds of milk during June
1996.  Price at delivery will be BFP
from two months earlier plus $3.75
(Class I differential of $2.50 and
Overorder premium of $1.25).  Coop
wants to lock in an attractive fluid milk
sales price as reflected by current
futures quote for April.  Price objective
is $15.75.
Case I:  Futures price decline/No basis change
Apr. '96 BUY 20 Apr. contracts
Jun. '96 Cooperative delivers milk to bottler.  $3.75
Gain/(Loss) ($0.25) $0.25
Net Gain  $0.00
Gross pay price is $15.50
@ $11.75.
Case II:  Futures price increase/No basis change
Apr. '96 BUY 20 Apr. contracts
Jun. '96 Cooperative delivers milk to bottler.   $3.75
Gain/(Loss)  $1.00 ($1.00)
Net Gain  $0.00
Gross pay price is $16.75.
@ $13.00
There is one other complexity that should be discussed.  Note that nothing is said in this
example about what the cooperative pays its members in the month of June.  The June BFP could be19
much lower or higher than the April BFP.  How can this be a risk-free hedge if the cooperative price
is unknown when the hedge is lifted.  
The answer is in federal order pricing and pooling rules.  The cooperative accounts to the
federal order pool for its Class I disposition at the federal order Class I price, which for June Class
I sales, is set in April.  Consequently, even if the BFP is different between April and June, the Class
I price obligation is fixed in April.  The cost of the milk in terms of the cooperative pay price may be
different from expectations because producer premiums may be higher or lower than predicted.  But
this risk applies whether or not the cooperative hedges; hence, it is not a part of basis risk in this
example.  (But see the next example!)
A second example illustrates a fixed price contractual arrangement.  In January 1996, a
cooperative agrees to supply milk to a bottler in June 1996 at $16.00 per hundredweight.  To protect
itself against adverse price movements that would cause a loss, the cooperative wants to lock in the
cost of the milk it will supply at the fixed price.  This calls for a long hedge.
In this example, the basis is calculated as the cost of milk to the cooperative less the futures
price (assumed to price the BFP).  In practice, the cooperative would set its sales price by adding its
expected basis to the futures market prediction of the BFP for the pricing month.  The cost of milk
is largely fixed by federal order pricing and pooling rules.  However, there is an element of basis risk
associated with "plant premiums" (premiums over the federal order blend price).  In building its basis,
the cooperative assumed it would pay a Grade A plant premium of $1.00 per hundredweight.  In Case
II, the actual premium paid was only $.75, leading to a hedging "profit" equal to the amount by which
the basis weakened ($.25).  Had the basis strengthened, the hedge would have yielded a loss equal
to the change.
Cooperative contracts to supply milk to a fluid bottler at a specified price in the future.
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
Jan. '96 Cooperative commits to provide 1 BUY 20 Apr. contracts $2.50
million pounds of milk to a fluid bottler @ $12.00.
during June 1996 at a fixed price of
$16.00.
Class I Differential = $1.50.
Grade A premium to patrons is $1.00
over the order blend price.  Projected
cost of milk is $14.50. (BFP plus
$2.50)
Case I:  Futures price decline/No basis change20
Apr. '96 SELL 20 Apr.
Jun. '96 Cooperative procures milk to meet $2.50
Gain/(Loss) $0.25 ($0.25)
Net Gain $0.00
contract.  Accounts to federal order
pool at $13.25 Class I price ($11.75
BFP plus $1.50 Class I differential). 
Pays producers a June '96 plant
premium of $1.00 (over the order blend
price).  Cost of milk is $14.25.
contracts @ $11.75.
Case II:  Futures price increase/Basis Weakens
Apr. '96 SELL 20 Apr.
Jun. '96 Cooperative procures milk to meet $2.25
Gain/(Loss) ($.75) $1.00
Net Gain  $.25 
contract.  Accounts to federal order
pool at $14.50 Class I price ($13.00
BFP plus $1.50 Class I differential). 
Pays producers a June '96 plant
premium of $.75 (over the order blend
price).  Cost of milk is $15.25.
contracts @ $13.00
CASH FORWARD PRICING
Milk futures can be used by dairy plants to offer fixed price contracts to their dairy farmer
suppliers.  The cheddar cheese contract on the CSCE has been used for this purpose by cooperatives
heavily involved in manufacturing cheese.  The new milk futures may provide superior hedging
opportunities for plants making other dairy products whose prices are tied as closely as cheese to the
BFP.  Some cheese plants might also choose to use milk futures rather than the cheese futures for
hedging cash forward contracts.21
A simple example of cash forward contracting by a cheese plant using milk futures is
illustrated below.  The example is simple because it implies a very rudimentary basis calculation.  Cash
market gains and losses are calculated  relative to "opportunity cost," i.e., in relation to what
competitors paid for milk.
Cheese plant offers cash forward price contract to dairy farmers; hedges obligation in milk futures
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
Jan. '96 Plant offers fixed price contract to SELL Apr. milk $1.00
Grade A patrons.  Will pay $14.00 base contracts @ $13.00.
price (3.5% butterfat) for April milk. 
Contract price is derived as follows:
  $13.00 BFP
+    .75 Normal Apr. "pool draw"
+    .25 Plant premium
  $14.00
Case I:  Futures price decline/No basis change
Apr. '96 Plant pays producers the contract price BUY Apr. milk $1.00
Gain/(Loss)  $0.00 $1.00
Net Gain
of $14.00.  Competitors pay $13.00. contracts @ $12.00.
($1.00)
Case II:  Futures price increase/No basis change
Apr. '96 Plant pays producers the contract price BUY Apr. milk $1.50
Gain/(Loss)  $0.00 ($1.00)
Net Gain
of $14.00.  Competitors pay $15.00. contracts @ $14.00
 $1.00
The plant offering the forward pricing arrangement establishes its future pay price according
to the futures market price for milk.  In this case, the April price offer is set in January by adding the
manufacturing plant's expected "pool draw" and its plant premium to the futures market prediction
of the BFP.  The pool draw is the difference between the reported federal order blend price for the
month and the Class III, or Basic Formula Price.  Pooled manufacturing plants receive this draw to
make up the difference between the blend price (which all regulated handlers are obligated to pay22
their producers) and the Class III price (the order-specified value of milk used to make cheese).  As
described earlier, the plant premium is over the blend price, and reflects competition among plants
for milk.
The pool draw and the plant premium comprise the basis, which is added to the futures price
to derive the Grade A price offer.  The plant is committed to paying $14.00 per hundredweight.  To
protect itself against adverse price movements, which would prevent the plant from paying the fixed
price, the plant hedges by selling April milk futures contracts equivalent in volume to the volume of
milk contracted at the fixed price.
If there is no change in the basis from what was predicted when the hedge was placed, then
futures market gains will offset cash market losses if futures market prices fall.  Cash market losses,
in this case, are relative to what competitors paid for milk.  In case I of the example, the plant offering
the forward contract would be at a serious competitive disadvantage if it were obligated to pay
$14.00 while its competitors making the same product could acquire milk at $13.00.
In case II, the plant loses $1.00 per hundredweight from its futures market transaction because
the futures price (and the BFP) rose by $1.00 between the time the hedge was placed and when it was
removed.  However, this loss is offset by the lower price the plant pays for contracted milk relative
to competitors.  Obviously, those dairy farmers holding fixed price contracts would not be very
pleased by this turn of events.  But they received the price they agreed to contract for in January.
It is instructive to compare this cash forward pricing arrangement with one involving a hedge
in cheese futures.  The following example shows an identical Grade A cash forward price quote
derived from the CSCE cheddar cheese futures.  Basis is derived in a different fashion.  First, the
cheese futures price is converted to gross revenue per hundredweight by multiplying by expected
yield of cheese per hundredweight of milk (assumed to be 10 pounds in the example).  Then, the gross
value is adjusted by added revenue associated with the plant pool draw and plant costs, yielding a net
value to milk.  The net value, representing what the plant can profitably afford to pay for milk, is the
cash forward price offer.  The basis is the difference between the net value of milk and the futures
price for cheese times expected cheese yield.
Both the pool draw and plant costs are sources of basis risk in this hedging example.  In Case
II, the pool draw is $.25 less than expected and net make cost is $.10 more than expected.  This
weakens the basis by $.35, resulting in a hedging loss.  Other sources of basis risk include cheese yield
variations and local cheese prices varying from the futures price at the time of offset.
Cheese plant offers cash forward price contract to dairy farmers; hedges obligation in cheese futures
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis23
Jan. '96 Plant offers fixed price contract to SELL May cheese $0.00
Grade A patrons.  Will pay $14.00 base contracts @ $1.40
price (3.5% butterfat) for May milk. 
Contract price is derived as follows:
$14.00 Cheddar cheese price X 10
+ .75 Normal Apr. "pool draw"
-  .75 Net make cost           
$14.00
Case I:  Futures price decline/No basis change
May '96 Plant pays producers the contract price BUY May cheese $0.00
Gain/(Loss) ($1.00) $1.00
Net Gain  $0.00
of $14.00.  Cheese revenue is contracts @ $1.30
$1.00/Cwt. less than expected.  Pool
draw and net make cost are both $.75. 
Net milk value is $13.00.
Case II:  Futures price increase/Basis weakens
May '96 Plant pays producers the contract price BUY May cheese ($.35)
Gain/(Loss)  $.15 ($.50)
Net Gain ($.35)
of $14.00.  Cheese revenue is contracts @ $1.45
$.50/Cwt. more than expected.  Pool
draw is $.50 and net make cost is $.85. 
Net milk value is $14.15.
DAIRY FARMER HEDGE
Dairy farmers can hedge milk sales using the cheddar cheese or the nonfat dry milk contracts.
But hedges based on these contracts are cross-hedges, requiring the conversion of cheese or nonfat
dry milk prices to equivalent milk prices.  Hedging Grade A milk at the farm against the milk futures
contract is a direct hedge, which makes it simpler to calculate basis if payment is made on a volume
basis.  Moreover, the milk contracts are for 50,000 pounds of milk, which is smaller than the
equivalent volume of milk associated with the product contracts.  Consequently, smaller farmers
should be better-able to utilize the milk contracts for hedging.24
A simplified dairy farmer hedge is illustrated below, in which a dairy farmer sells 2 April milk
contracts to hedge expected April Grade A milk production of 100,000 pounds.  Given specific on-
farm conditions with respect to milk composition, size of herd, milk quality, etc.;  buyer conditions
with respect to the buyer's premium structure (plant volume, quality, protein, etc.); and milk
utilization by class in the federal order market; the farmer has determined that a $13.00 BFP
correlates to a Grade A milk price of $14.00.  That price looks favorable compared to production
costs, so the farmer attempts to lock the price in through a short hedge.  In Case I, with a constant
basis, the lower cash market price from a lower BFP is offset by futures market gains.  In cases II and
III, offsets are not exact because the basis at the time the hedge was lifted was different from what
was expected at the time the hedge was placed.  Net gains are experienced with a strengthened basis
and losses are incurred when the basis weakens.
The farm-level Grade A price associated with a particular BFP was merely specified in this
example.  In reality, considerable analysis would be necessary to derive the basis and there would be
several sources of basis risk.  The minimum federal order blend price varies with utilization by class
as well as with the BFP; hence the blend price relative to the BFP is not constant.  A plant's base pay
price relative to the federal order blend price varies with product mix, extent of competition, and
premium structure.  Farmers' butterfat and protein tests, somatic cell count and other quality
variables, herd size, and a host of other factors cause actual pay prices to deviate from base pay
prices.
Dairy Farmer Hedge
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
Jan. '96 Dairy farmers expects to sell SELL 2 Apr. milk con- $1.00
100,000 pounds of Grade A milk in tracts @ $13.00
April.  Price expectation based on
April futures price is $14.00
Case I:  Futures price decline/No basis change
Apr. '96 Sell 100,000 pounds of milk @ BUY 2 Apr. milk contracts $1.00
Gain/(Loss) ($1.00) $1.00
Net Gain  $0.00
$13.00. @ $12.00.
Case II:  Futures price decline/Basis weakens       The Wisconsin Grade A price shown in Figure 2 is at average butterfat test, while the M-W price is adjusted
9
to a 3.5 percent butterfat basis.  The seasonal pattern of price differences is related primarily to milk composition,
especially butterfat.  Butterfat tests tend to be lowest in the summer and highest in the late fall.  Note that this
price series represents the value of all Grade A milk (regardless of use) and is different from the Grade A
manufacturing milk price series discussed earlier.
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Case III:  Futures price increase/Basis strengthens




But regardless of the complexities associated with calculating basis, basis risk for hedgers is
usually much smaller than price risk for those who choose not to hedge.  The relationship between
Grade A prices and the BFP is very strong.  Note from Figure 2 the large swings in the Wisconsin
average Grade A price and the M-W price (predecessor to the BFP) over the last 10 years.   Two-
9
dollar price changes within a year have become the norm.  Note in contrast the small within-year
differences between the Grade A price and the M-W price.  The difference in prices is quite
predictable relative to the absolute prices.  Moreover, the price differences exhibit a pronounced
seasonal pattern, suggesting even more predictability.
This seasonality is detailed in Figure 3, which shows the 10-year average difference between
the Wisconsin Grade A price and the M-W price by month.  The monthly difference peaks in the late
fall and troughs in mid-summer.  The upper and lower ranges shown in the chart represent the 90
percent confidence intervals for the price differences.  For example, if the same relationship between
the two price series continues, one can be 90 percent confident that the Wisconsin Grade A price will
exceed the M-W (BFP) by between $.50 and $1.25 in June.       See Marketing and Policy Briefing Papers No. 49 (USDA's Recommended Decision on Multiple
10
Component Pricing for Midwestern Federal Milk Marketing Orders) and No. 53 (USDA's Final Decision on
Multiple Component Pricing for Midwest Federal Milk Marketing Orders) for a detailed explanation of the
MCP plan and how it will affect payment for milk.
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Figure 2
MULTIPLE COMPONENT PRICING AND HEDGING
Beginning with milk checks written for January marketings, most Grade A milk producers in
the Upper Midwest will have their milk priced according to its component values.  Five federal orders
in the Upper Midwest have been amended to require Multiple Component  Pricing (MCP).  Under
MCP, producers will be paid for pounds of protein, butterfat, and other solids in milk.  This is in
contrast to current federal order pricing in the region, under which  producers are paid for milk
volume plus or minus a butterfat differential.
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Figure 3
The switch to MCP in Upper Midwest federal orders affects hedging.  Producers are no
longer paid for milk; they are paid for milk components.  Consequently, producers cannot directly
hedge expected milk component marketings against the CSCE and CME milk contracts, which are
written in terms of milk volume.  Likewise, handlers who use milk for Class III and Class II purposes
must pay for milk components, not for milk volume.
This does not mean that producers and handlers cannot use the new milk contracts for
hedging.  It does mean that hedges will be cross hedges -- hedging milk component prices against a
per hundredweight milk value -- instead of direct hedges.  In placing hedges,  producers and handlers
will need to convert futures milk prices to milk component prices or convert component prices to an
equivalent milk price.
An example will illustrate how a producer might perform these conversions  in establishing
a basis prediction.  At the same time, the example will reiterate how MCP values will be determined.
Suppose that in January 1996, the CME July 1996 contract is trading at $12.50, and that this reflects28
the expected BFP for that month.  A producer wants to know what the $12.50 price means in terms
of his or her expected Grade A price for July.
The first step is to calculate component values per pound associated with the futures price.
Priced components are butterfat, protein, and other solids.  The milk contract prices are expressed
in terms of 3.5 percent butterfat.   However, the amounts of protein and other nonfat solids embodied
in the futures price are unknown.
Under MCP, butterfat is priced in relation to butter prices as reflected by the monthly average
CME cash market for Grade A butter.  This price is widely quoted in dairy publications.  The formula
to convert butter prices to butterfat prices is complex, but a good rule of thumb is to multiply the
CME butter price by 1.1 to derive the related butterfat price per pound.  Suppose the producer thinks
that the butter price in July will be $1.00 per pound.  Using the rule of thumb, that means a butterfat
price of $1.10 per pound.
The MCP protein price is 1.32 times the monthly average National Cheese Exchange (Green
Bay) opinion for 40-pound block cheddar cheese.  Since the specifications match closely, a reasonable
estimate of the NCE block cheese price in July is the CSCE futures price for block cheddar cheese
for the delivery month closest to the milk contract delivery month.  Suppose the July 1996 CSCE
cheese contract is trading at $1.35 per pound.  That would predict a July protein price of (1.32 X
1.35) = $1.782 per pound.
The price for other solids under MCP is calculated as a residual to the BFP.  Specifically, the
other solids price per pound is the BFP minus the value of 3.5 pounds of butterfat minus the average
protein test associated with the BFP times the protein price per pound all divided by the average other
solids test associated with the BFP.  The BFP protein and other solids tests vary seasonally, but are
relatively constant from year-to-year.  Suppose the average BFP protein and other solids test for July
average 3.2 and 5.5 percent respectively.  Then, the estimated other solids price per pound would be:
[$12.50 - (3.5 X $1.10) - (3.2 X $1.782)]/5.5 = $.536
With these expected component values associated with the July futures price for milk, the
producer can then estimate his or her farm level Grade A milk price consistent with the futures quote.
The producer's component levels will likely be different from those used to calculate the MCP
component prices.  Suppose the producer expects July herd milk to test 3.8 percent butterfat, 3.4
percent protein, and 5.6 percent other solids.  Given the milk component values calculated above,
milk value consistent with the $12.50 futures price would be:
3.8 X $1.100 =  $4.18  = butterfat value per hundredweight
+ 3.4 X $1.782 =  6.06  = protein value per hundredweight
+ 5.6 X $0.536 = 3.00 = other solids value per hundredweight
$13.24 = total milk component value per hundredweight29
The producer's milk is expected to be worth 74 cents per hundredweight more than the July
1996 futures market BFP prediction because of higher component values.  Since the milk is Grade
A and purchased by a plant regulated under a federal order, the producer will receive an additional
producer price differential reflecting market-wide utilization and prices of classes of milk other than
Class III.  Let's say that, based on historical records, the producer price differential is expected to be
$.35 per hundredweight in our example.
The producer will also receive a premium or a penalty to the extent herd somatic cell count
(SCC) for the month differs from 350,000.  The premium/penalty per 100,000 SCC below/above
350,000 will be between 6 and 7 cents, depending on the cheese price for the month.  Let's assume
the producer expects to have a herd SCC of 150,000 in July, and that this  would qualify for a
premium of 13 cents per hundredweight.
Finally, the producer would probably be eligible to receive other premiums on top of the
federal order minimum price.  These might include plant premiums, volume premiums, and, possibly,
quality premiums over and above the federal order SCC premium.  Assume the producer expects
these other premiums to total $.25 per hundredweight in July based on previous experience.
The producer's expected total milk value per hundredweight with these assumptions would
be:
$13.24 = Milk component value
+ .35 = Producer price differential
+ .13 = Somatic Cell Count Premium
+ .25 = Non-order producer price enhancements
$13.97 = Expected Grade A price
Stated differently, the producer's basis prediction is $1.47 per hundredweight after converting
MCP component values to milk equivalent and accounting for other distinctions between the futures
market price quotation and the manner in which farm-level Grade A prices are established.  There are
many elements making up the basis and, consequently, many sources of basis risk.  But experience
with relating actual pay prices with the BFP should serve to minimize basis risk.
SUMMARY
The two new milk futures contracts offer dairy farmers and other buyers and sellers of milk
and dairy products additional opportunities to manage price risk in an increasingly volatile milk price
environment.  The availability of these risk management tools is especially important given the
market-oriented direction of federal dairy policy.
The CSCE and CME contracts differ somewhat in their specifications.  Potential hedgers will
need to evaluate which offers the best opportunity to lock in prices.  Hedgers should also look at the30
cheese and nonfat dry milk contracts in determining the most appropriate risk management strategy.
Strategies may involve using more than one futures market.
Key in any hedging decision is the basis, especially the predictability of the relationship
between cash and futures prices.  Hedgers should compare the alternative contracts in terms of which
yields the most predictable basis given the type of hedge and the specific market conditions affecting
their business.